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I. INTRODUCTION 
This reply is filed by the State of Washington as a legal response to 
Plaintiff/Respondents' 2014 Post-Budget Filing (Plfs' 2014 Resp.), as 
permitted by the Court in a letter dated May 1, 2014. It is not a 
supplement to the Legislature's Report filed on April 30. 
The State has not achieved full implementation of the reforms 
scheduled for phase-in by 2018. However, it has demonstrated that, with 
guidance from the Court, there is momentum toward finding the political 
consensus needed to complete the task. Plaintiffs have made creative 
arguments claiming the State has failed to implement reforms that it 
actually has implemented, and they have woven an illusion of precedent 
for an array of sanctions that actually are without precedent. This State's 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches all share the goal of achieving 
full article IX compliance through implementation of the reforms 
embodied in Engrossed Substitute House Bill 2261 (ESHB 2261) and 
subsequent education reform legislation. The imposition of sanctions 
would not advance this shared goal. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 5, 2012, this Court issued a decision holding that the 
State was not meeting its obligation to amply provide for the education of 
all children within its borders as required in article IX, section 1 of the 
state constitution. McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d. 477, 545-46, 269 P.3d 
227 (2012). The Court rejected both the trial court's remedy ordering 
another study and Plaintiffs' proposed remedy requiring full compliance at 
the end of the next school year (2011-12). !d. at 541-46. Instead, the 
Court endorsed the Legislature's enacted reforms embodied in 
ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548) and subsequent legislation, which 
contemplated implementation by 2018. The Court retained jurisdiction to 
"monitor implementation of the reforms under ESHB 2261, and more 
generally, the State's compliance with its paramount duty," with the 
express goal of "fostering dialogue and cooperation between coordinate 
branches of state government in facilitating the constitutionally required 
reforms." McCleary, 173 Wn.2d. at 543-46. The Court did not specify 
which actions must be taken by the 2012 Legislature; neither did it attempt 
to set specific priorities. 
In July 2012, after the legislative session had concluded, the Court 
issued a procedural order for its retained jurisdiction, which provided for 
annual legislative reports to the Court, followed by comments filed by 
Plaintiffs. McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 2 (July 18, 2012). 
The Court declined to "measure the steps taken in each legislative session 
between 2012 and 2018 against full constitutional compliance," but 
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indicated that the State must "show real and measurable progress" toward 
achieving full compliance. !d. at 3. 
The 2013 Legislature appropriated new funding for basic education 
during the 2013-15 bie1mhm1, as summarized in its 2013 report to the 
Court. 1 The Court responded by acknowledging the "meaningful steps" 
the 2013 Legislature had taken to address funding for education, but 
criticized the amount and extent of progress, suggesting possible harsh 
enforcement actions in the near term. McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, 
Order (Jan. 9, 2014). The Court ordered the State to submit its next report 
by April 30, 2014, containing "a complete plan for fully implementing its 
program of basic education for each school year between now and the 
2017-18 school year" that addresses "each of the areas of K -12 education 
identified in ESBH 2261, as well as the implementation plan called for by 
SHB 2776 [Laws of2010, ch. 236]" that includes "a phase-in schedule for 
fully funding each of the components of basic education." !d. at 8. 
The Legislature, through the Article IX Committee, submitted its 
report on April 30, 2014.Z 
1 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee 
on Article IX Litigation (Aug. 29, 2013) (Leg. 2013 Report). 
2 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee 
on Article IX Litigation (Apr. 30, 2014) (Leg. 2014 Report). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Misrepresent the Status of Implementation and Seek 
to Relitigate Funding Formulas This Court Already Approved 
In their haste to assign "three strikes" in support of a punitive order 
against the Legislature, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the implementation the 
State has accomplished to date. Their continued assertion that the State 
has been stalling for 36 years is an example of false hyperbole that serves 
no useful purpose. "Reform has been continual since [the Seattle School 
District case] and neither the Legislature's commitment nor its sincerity in 
addressing .this perennial problem should be in doubt." CP 2932 (Trial 
Court, FF 239). Plaintiffs' efforts reflect a desire to relitigate portions of 
the case and, rather than accept the timeline the Court established, to 
continue their quest for immediate implementation. The Court retained 
jurisdiction to monitor the State's implementation of the financial reforms 
adopted in ESHB 2261, not to relitigate the funding formulas adopted in 
that bill. 
In its McCleary decision, the Court endorsed reform legislation 
initiated by ESHB 2261 and its foundational work as an appropriate 
remedy, provided it is implemented. McCleary, at 542. According to an 
unchallenged finding of fact from the trial court, ESHB 2261 was 
endorsed by "educators, school districts and by state and local officials," 
4 
including persons and entities who are Plaintiffs in this case. CP 2935 
(Trial Court, FF 249); see also McCleary, at 544 (quoting Superintendent 
of Public Instruction). Under ESHB 2261, actual costs are provided for 
through a prospective allocation model rather than through reimbursement 
of expenditures. McCleary, at 541-42; Leg. 2014 Report at 40. 
Moreover, the Legislature has not overstated in any of its reports to 
the Court the extent or degree to which it has implemented the reforms 
initiated in ESHB 2261. Thus far, it has not let pass any specific deadline 
enacted in SHB 2776. Because implementation is an ongoing process, and 
because the filings by the parties each year build upon previous filings, it 
is necessary to correct some misperceptions perpetuated in Plaintiffs' 
filings. 
1. The Highly Capable Program is Fully Funded 
Plaintiffs argue, for example, that the State did not demonstrate 
any progress in 2014 toward fully funding the Highly Capable program. 
Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 23. The reason is simple: the Highly Capable 
program is fully funded. Under the formula specified in 
RCW 28A.150.260(1 0)( c), the Legislature appropriates funding to support 
programs for highly capable students. It appropriated $19,232,000 for the 
2013-15 biennium to fully fund the amount required by the formula. Laws 
of 2013, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 511. Plaintiffs do not explain why the 
5 
appropriation is insufficient. They supply nothing in the way of evidence 
or credible argument that the program is anything less than fully funded. 
Instead, they reference regulations adopted by OSPI to implement the 
program that is now part of basic education. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 23: 
These regulations require school districts to provide services for the most 
highly capable students. RCW 28A.150.260(10)(c); WAC 392-170. 
Districts continue to receive additional funding for providing these 
services. 
2. Reforming Basic Education to Implement 24 Credits for 
Graduation Did Not Violate Any Court Order 
In 2014, the Legislature responded to school district and educator 
requests to convert increased hours to increased credits. Leg. 2014 Report 
at 18-24. Plaintiffs treat the Legislature's responsiveness as a failure to 
comply with a Court Order. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 24-26. It is not. As 
explained in the Legislature's 2014 Report, and as Plaintiffs concede,3 the 
Legislature made an educational policy decision that had consensus in the 
educational community. It enhanced the prototypical school funding 
model by, for example, reducing laboratory class sizes and increasing the 
high school allocation for materials, supplies, and operating costs (MSOC) 
to further support Career and College Ready Graduation Requirements. 
3 Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 25. 
6 
Leg. 2014 Report at 22-23. It also provided flexibility to school districts 
on minimum hour requirements. That reallocation of dollars violates no 
order of the Court. Rather it effectuates the shared expectation that the 
Legislature will continue to review and revise the basic education program 
as needed. McCleary, at 526-27; RCW 28A.150.1981. 
3. The Pupil Transportation Formula is Fully 
Implemented for the2014-15 School Year 
ESHB 2261 included a new "expected cost model" formula for 
Pupil Transportation, predicting costs using a regression analysis based on 
the number of students transported and a set of statistically significant 
characteristics for each district. RCW 28A.160.180. "The Office of 
Financial Management (OFM), with the help of consultants, developed a 
new pupil transportation funding model which was then adopted in 
ESHB 2261." Quality Education Council Initial Report to the Governor, 
January 13, 2010 (2010 QEC Report) at p. 4.4 Under SHB 2776, the plan 
was for the new formula to be phased in until fully implemented during 
the 2013-15 biennium. RCW 28A.l60.192. It will be fully implemented 
for the first time for the 2014-15 school year. The Legislature 
appropriated funding in the 2013-15 biennial budget sufficient to cover 40 
percent of the gap between the 2011-12 baseline and full funding in the 
4 Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 22, n. 68; http://www.kl2.wa.us/QEC/pubdocs/QEC2010 
report. pdf. 
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2013-14 school year, ramping up to full implementation for the 2014-15 
school year. Laws of 2013, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 505(2); Leg. 2013 
Report at 12-13. In the 2014 supplemental budget, the Legislature 
increased the initial FY 2015 appropriation from $427,408,000 to 
$429,312,000, including a set-aside of $558,000 for anomalies not 
addressed by the formula, such as a district's unusual geographical 
configuration. Districts that meet a minimum efficiency rating and can 
demonstrate their actual prior year costs exceed the. expected cost 
allocations due to exceptional circumstances are eligible for additional 
money from this set-aside. Laws of2014, ch. 221, § 503(3). 
The plaintiffs are incorrect in their 2014 Response (which by and 
large cites as authority their incorrect 2013 Response) in suggesting that 
the new funding formula is legally flawed or that full implementation will 
not be achieved for the 2014-15 school year. First, this Court accepted 
ESHB 2261 as a valid attempt to account for actual costs of the state 
program. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate that issue here, 
where the Court is monitoring implementation, not reassessing the statute. 
Second, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with no credible evidence from 
which it can possibly conclude that the $429,312,000 appropriated for 
FY 2015, plus any 2015 supplemental amount, will fail to fully implement 
pupil transportation. 
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Citing their own 2013 Response, Plaintiffs claim the State must be 
failing to take into account assumed rising fuel costs. But, neither their 
2013 Response nor their 2014 Response contains any evidence related to 
fuel costs or evidence that the expected cost formula fails to adequately 
account for fuel costs within its statistical analysis. 
Plaintiffs also claim various state documents show underfunding. 
They do nothing of the sort. None of the documents cherry-picked by 
Plaintiffs "show" underfunding of transportation for the 2014-15 school 
year-not the March 2013 OSPI "Implementation of the New Student 
Transportation Funding System" status update,5 not the 2010 QEC Report, 
and not the documents cited in footnote 56 of their 2014 Response.6 None 
of those documents rely on updated data inputs. Anticipated cost 
estimates can swing wildly when attempting to project the enrollments of 
5 Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 17, n.54 (citingPlfs' 2013 Resp. at24-25, n. 75). 
6 Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 8, n.56. In their footnote, Plaintiffs cite a report of 
expenditures by school districts for 2012-13 as being greater than an estimated total for 
2014-15 found in a preliminary transportation allocation spreadsheet compiled by OSPI. 
Regarding the expenditures document, there is no foundation for determining whether 
expenditures coincide with eligible services. Regarding the transportation allocation 
spreadsheet, there is no foundation for the context of the estimates. The Court is 
provided no information on how the estimates may change with actual, audited data that 
may provide a basis for supplemental budget requests. Indeed, the face of the document 
explicitly cautions that "[t]he adjustment to actual will be made in the February 2015 
apportionment. Adjustments will be made based on reported student counts and route 
data. The formula coefficients will be adjusted based on statewide reported data from the 
2013-14 school year." http://www.k12.wa.us/safsiMisc/BudPrep14/Estimated%2014-
15%20Transportation%20Allocations.xlsx. In sum, there is no evidence to suggest any 
underfunding of whatever OSPI ultimately supplies as the proper cost amount based on 
the formula. 
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roughly one million students, inflation rates, and other factors into the 
future. The Legislature's 2014 Report explains the difference between 
formula changes and updated data or variables that are inputs to the 
fommla. Leg. 2014 Repmi at 13, 49-50. The outputs of the state funding 
process are necessarily fluid as the State steadily updates the model with 
actual audited data from school districts and adjusts apportionment 
accordingly. Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Id. 7 
Plaintiffs point to the projection in the March 2013 OSPI 
Transportation Status Update that, if the transportation formula were to be 
fully funded at $375.1 million, funding would be something less than 100 
percent of all districts' 2012-13 school year expenditures. Once again, 
this document tells the Court nothing about the relationship of those 
school districts' expenditures to appropriate services, costs, or efficiencies. 
It provides no information on student enrollment counts and thus no 
information on the costs for the 2014-15 school year. It provides no basis 
to conclude that the $429.3 million appropriated for student transportation 
for FY 2015 will fail to accomplish full implementation of the 
7 Plaintiffs in Montoy v. Kansas, 282 Kan. 9, 138 P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV), 
similarly argued that the court should rely on findings and conclusions contained in a cost 
study prepared for the legislature as it responded to judicial orders regarding public 
school funding. The court instead deferred to the legislature's treatment of the study, 
concluding that it should not consider the report to be "substantial competent evidence of 
the actual and necessary costs of providing a suitable education" because the cost study 
had not been subjected to the fact-fmding processes of litigation. Id. at 21. 
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transportation funding model, particularly in light of the extra set-aside for 
formula anomalies. 
The components of basic education that must be fully implemented 
are identified in the Court's January 8, 2012, decision. The Legislature's 
Reports to the Court have accurately reported its implementation progress. 
Plaintiffs' attempts to discredit the Reports are veiled attempts to relitigate 
portions of this case. Plaintiffs are arguing as if the Court ordered the 
State to implement a reimbursement model rather than the reformed 
allocation formulas embodied in ESHB 2261. 
B. Any Order Imposed by the Court Should Further the Goal of 
Achieving Ample Funding for Education 
No sanction is necessary to compel constitutional compliance. 
There is agreement between the Legislature and the Court that basic 
education must be amply funded. While there is not current political 
consensus on how best to achieve that end, there is progress toward 
resolution and preparation for significant work in the 2015 legislative 
session. Leg. 2014 Report at 25-33. 
Nevertheless, throughout this litigation, Plaintiffs have sought an 
order forcing immediate action by the Legislature. This Court properly 
rejected that request, recognizing its decision imposed on the Legislature a 
complex and challenging set of tasks that would require more than a single 
11 
legislative session to resolve. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545-47. The Court 
adopted the 2018 deadline the Legislature had set for itself to accomplish 
the tasks set before it and declined to establish intermediate benchmarks 
for assessing compliance. Id. at 549 (Madsen, C.J., concurring/ 
dissenting). See also McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 3 (July 18, 
2012) (order regarding retained jurisdiction; "it is not realistic to measure 
the steps taken in each legislative session between 2012 and 2018 against 
full constitutional compliance"). 
Accomplishing reform of this magnitude takes time to build 
political consensus; to evaluate existing education programs and modify 
them as necessary to incorporate updated information; to identify or 
develop appropriate reliable revenue sources; and to draft, consider, and 
enact implementing legislation. But the Plaintiffs' repeated call for 
immediate compliance has proved a clever litigation strategy, because 
anything other than immediate compliance can be characterized as 
intentional delay. 
The Legislature's decision not to adopt the reimbursement model 
Plaintiffs have advocated does not demonstrate resistance to the Court or 
to the constitutional duty to amply fund education. Under Plaintiffs' 
model, the state is virtually obligated to pay whatever amount of money 
each of the 295 independent school districts believes is necessary. That is 
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not a model for effectiveness, efficiency, or accountability, and it has not 
been mandated by the Court. 
Nevertheless, as is their pattern, Plaintiffs respond by agam 
advocating sanctions. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 46-49. Compare Plfs' 2013 
Resp. at 45-48; Plfs' 2012 Resp. at 42-43. Their request for sanctions 
reflects their refusal to accept this Court's denial of their request to require 
"full funding" immediately. It also reflects their tiresome contention that 
the Legislature-like former Governor George Wallace-is obstinately 
refusing to meet its constitutional duty. This is not Alabama in 1963 and 
Plaintiffs' continuing and repeated comparisons to segregationists is 
offensive and unproductive. 
The Legislature has made it clear through its reports to the Court 
that it is working to comply with article IX, section 1. As explained 
above, it has made measurable progress toward ultimate compliance. Its 
2014 Report acknowledges that the Legislature did not formally adopt a 
plan in response to the Order of January 9, 2014. But Plaintiffs' attempt to 
wrap that failure in a cloak of constitutional noncompliance, institutional 
recalcitrance, and offensive historical comparisons should be flatly and 
unequivocally rejected. 
No sanction should be issued. The Legislature is well aware of its 
constitutional duty and is moving toward completion of the task by the 
13 
2018 deadline this Court established. Imposing the type of onerous 
sanction Plaintiffs advocate would create distraction and slow progress. 
Nonetheless, were the Court inclined to consider a sanction, any 
sanction must lie within the Court's constitutional authority and should 
advance the goal of achieving compliance with article IX, section 1 by 
2018. The sanctions proposed or contemplated by Plaintiffs do not meet 
those two criteria. 
1. Contempt Order Against Legislature or Legislators 
Plaintiffs suggest the Court should hold "the governmental body or 
elected officials" in contempt of court. Plfs' 2014 Resp at 47, 49. We 
have found no case in which this Court has issued a contempt order 
against the Legislature or against any legislator. This Court has decided 
contempt proceedings as original actions for violations of its own orders, 8 
but the Court has never held the Legislature or a legislator in contempt for 
any such violation. The Court has considered contempt orders against 
executive branch officers and agencies9 and against a city, 10 but not 
against the Legislature or a legislator. 
8 See, e.g., In re Koome, 82 Wn.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973) (respondent 
violated stay); State v. Thompson, 99 Wash. 478, 169 P. 980 (1918) (respondents failed to 
comply with order to surrender possession of property). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 841-43, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001) 
(reversing court of appeals order to impose remedial contempt on state patrol because 
superior court had reversed order at issue); Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 251, 543 
P.2d 325 (1975) (delaying consideration of request to hold agency head in contempt, as 
14 
None of the cases Plaintiffs cite provide precedent for this Court to 
hold the Legislature in contempt, and we have found no case where any 
state's highest court issued or affirmed contempt sanctions against that 
state's own legislature. All of the cases Plaintiffs cite are federal cases 
and none involves a state legislature or implicates separation of powers 
among co-equal branches of state government.11 
alternative to mandamus) (no finding of contempt or order of mandamus was issued, see 
Bresolin v. Morris, 88 Wn.2d 167, 558 P.2d 1350 (1977)). 
10 See RIL Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wn.2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 
(1989) (affirming judgment of contempt against city for deliberately violating a 
permanent injunction). 
11 In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 
470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982), the court held that neither the Eleventh 
Amendment, nor "concerns for our federal system," nor the language of the Clean Air 
Act barred a civil contempt sanction against the state to enforce a consent judgment in an 
action brought by the United States against the state. Id. at 475-77. At issue was an 
automobile emissions control program the state legislature refused to fund; the remedy 
imposed for contempt was the withholding of federal highway funds. Id. at 478-79. 
In Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 
(1977), the court declined to vacate a contempt order against state executive branch 
officials who defied a district court order enjoining them from summarily seizin,g mental 
patients' property, and then failed to make payments agreed to in a subsequent consent 
judgment. The court of appeals rejected the state officials' procedural and institutional 
arguments and held that Eleventh Amendment immunity had been waived. Id. at 155-59. 
In U.S. v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 1988), the United States 
sued the city for intentionally maintaining racial segregation in residential areas and 
schools. The city ultimately entered into a consent judgment, but the city council refused 
to enact a public housing ordinance it had agreed to. The district court held the city and 
the four council members who voted against the ordinance in contempt and imposed 
financial sanctions. The court of appeals affirmed, primarily because the city-through 
the city council-had agreed to the terms of the consent judgment. I d. at 454. However, 
the Supreme Court reversed because (1) the city councilmembers were not named as 
parties, (2) imposition of sanctions against individual councilmembers was 
"extraordinary" and should not have been imposed until sanctions imposed on the city 
alone failed to secure compliance, and (3) considerations supporting the legislative 
immunity doctrine must inform the court's discretion in imposing sanctions. Spallone v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 265,280, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1990). 
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As explained in footnote 11, one of the federal cases Plaintiffs 
cited was reversed by the United States Supreme Court citing, inter alia, 
considerations underlying the legislative immunity doctrine. The doctrine 
of legislative immunity does not, of course, prevent this Court from 
determining the constitutionality of the Legislature's actions and ordering 
compliance. That power is beyond question. But not all remedies 
ordinarily available to a court in civil litigation are consistent with the 
separation of powers and the independence afforded the Legislature and its 
members under our constitutional scheme. When the Washington 
Constitution was adopted, for example, the federal Speech or Debate 
Clause was understood to protect legislators from any liability or judicial 
action for their legislative votes. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 
204, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880). The framers of our Constitution presumably 
shared that understanding when adopting a state speech and debate clause 
in article II, section 17, such that a contempt order directed at legislative 
actions of individual legislators would contravene article II, section 17. 
Plaintiffs also cite Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
522 (1978), but that case did not involve a contempt proceeding. At issue was whether, 
under the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could order that attorney fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 be paid from public funds. Id. at 690-91. The Court discussed 
contempt only for comparison, concluding that the award of attorney fees for bad faith 
served the same purpose as a remedial fme imposed for civil contempt. !d. at 691. 
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2. Order Prohibiting State Expenditures 
Plaintiffs suggest the Court could prohibit the Legislature from 
making expenditures for non-educational programs until the court's 
constitutional ruling is complied with. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. They offer 
no suggestion as to what expenditures should or could be prohibited or on 
what basis, and they display no concern for the public value of other 
programs and services or for the citizens who rely on them. Again, they 
cite only federal cases, none of which prohibited spending on unrelated 
programs, and none of which involved a state legislature or implicated 
. f 12 separatiOn o powers. 
12 In two of the cited cases, black residents prevailed in actions alleging their 
cities had discriminated against black neighborhoods in providing certain city services. 
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981), ajj'd in part and 
reversed and remanded in part, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of 
Kissimmee, Fla., 645 F. Supp. 571, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1986). In both cases, the district court 
declined to order the city to institute specific programs or construction projects in black 
neighborhoods, but enjoined the city from spending any funds on the construction or 
improvement of municipal services in white neighborhoods until the services in black 
neighborhoods were on par with those in white neighborhoods. Dowdell, 511 F. Supp. at 
1384; Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 588-89. The relief in Baker was patterned after that in 
Dowdell. Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 589. 
The other case cited by Plaintiffs is a discrimination case challenging racial 
segregation in Virginia public schools. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 
377 U.S. 218, 84 S. Ct. 1226, 12 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1964). In response to earlier court 
decisions, the state had tried various means to preserve segregated schools, ultimately 
settling on a program that repealed compulsory public education, made school attendance 
a matter of local option, and provided tuition grants for private schools. !d. at 222. After 
a court ordered the public schools in Prince Edward County to admit students without 
regard to race, the county supervisors refused to levy school taxes, closed the schools, 
and passed ordinances to provide fmancial support for segregated private schools. 
Griffin, at 222. The Supreme Court held the county's action violated equal protection 
and affirmed the district court's injunction barring fmancial support for private schools 
while public schools remain closed. !d. at 233. 
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3. Order Requiring State Expenditures 
Plaintiffs suggest the Court could order the Legislature to pass 
legislation to provide specific funding. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. Three of 
the cases they cite are federal school desegregation cases that invoke 
federal rights and the Supremacy Clause, but not separation of powers. 13 
13 One of the cases, Griffin, is discussed above in footnote 12. Faced with an 
unrepentant and recalcitrant school system in that case, the Supreme Court stated in 
dictum that the district court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination, 
require county legislators to "exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise 
funds" adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain a nondiscriminatory public school 
system. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added). The Court did not authorize the 
district court to assume the legislative function. 
In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990), 
the Court again was faced with a segregated school system. After several attempts to 
devise a remedy that would ensure funding for the desegregation plan, the district court 
ordered a property tax increase and the issuance of capital improvement bonds. I d at 41-
42. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion. Id at 52. "In 
assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation the District Court not 
only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether." Id. at 51. The Court 
made a broader observation: 
"The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a ... 
public school system suggests that there will be more than one 
constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that . . . the 
legislature's efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to 
respect." 
Id. at 52 (quoting San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S. Ct. 
1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973) (internal quotes omitted)). 
In Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 712 F.2d 809 (2d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom Griffin v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Buffalo, N.Y., 466 U.S. 
936 (1984), city officialsdeclined to fund the cost of implementing certain desegregation 
efforts ordered by the district court. The district court found that the board of education 
had demonstrated the need for additional money to carry out the desegregation orders and 
that city officials had made no effort to ascertain what funds were needed, and it ordered · 
the city to provide the funds. Id at 478-79, 484. 
Interestingly, counsel for the plaintiff parents declined to defend the district 
court's order on appeal, because he believed school boards operating under desegregation 
orders were using the orders to pursue "their private agendas of unmet educational 
needs," and then blaming advocates of school desegregation for the added fmancial 
burdens courts were imposing. Arthur, 712 F.2d at 813. 
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The single state case they cite provides only a cursory analysis of 
separation of powers in determining a remedy. They cite no case 
supporting judicial control over the enactment of legislation. 
Plaintiffs cite one decision in a long-running dispute over 
education funding in Kansas, but do not provide context. The Kansas 
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling that the legislature had not 
made "suitable provision" for financing public schools, as required in the 
state constitution, but it then stopped: "We do not dictate the precise way 
in which the legislature must fulfill its constitutional duty. That is for the 
legislators to decide, consistent with the Kansas Constitution." Montoy v. 
Kansas, 278 Kan. 769, 775, 120 P.3d 306 (2005) (Montoy II). 
The Kansas Legislature responded by adopting legislation, which 
the court found inadequate in Montoy v. Kansas, 279 Kan. 817, 112 P.3d 
923 (2005) (Montoy III). The court dismissed separation of powers 
concerns in reliance on a student note in a law review arguing that 
equitable power is appropriate if exercised after legislative 
noncompliance. Jd. at 828-29. Finding a need for immediate relief, the 
court ordered the legislature to increase funding for the upcoming school 
year by at least $285 million. Montoy III, at 845.14 A month later, the 
14 It is this part of this single decision that Plaintiffs cite. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47 
(citing Plfs' 2013 Resp. at 46 n.137). 
19 
court approved a legislative increase of half that amount. Montoy v. 
Kansas, 282 Kan. 9, 15, 138 P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV) (citing 
unpublished order). 
During its next session the legislature revised its school finance 
formula, adding additional funding. The court held the legislature had 
complied with the court's previous orders, and remanded with directions 
to dismiss the action. Id. at 24-25, 26-27. 15 
Read together, the Montoy decisions show a pattern of deference to 
the legislative's constitutional role. 
4. Order Requiring Sale of State Property 
Plaintiffs suggest the Court could order the sale of state property to 
fund constitutional compliance. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. 16 They offer no 
examples, of course, of property that might be sold. Neither do they offer 
15 The court declined to consider the constitutionality of the new legislation, 
holding that it must be challenged in a new action in the trial court: 
We have already made the determination that the school fmance 
formula which was before this court in Montoy II was unconstitutional. 
The school fmance system we review today is not the system we 
reviewed in Montoy II or Montoy Ill. The sole issue now before this 
court is whether the [legislative acts] comply with the previous orders 
of this court. If they do then our inquiry ends and this case must be 
dismissed. 
Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 18-19. 
16 Plaintiffs cite a single case in support of this remedy, but they mischaracterize 
it. In Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the court did not order the sale 
of any state property; rather, it ordered that the proceeds of excess property that the state 
already had advertised for sale must be used to help pay for a school transportation 
system to comply with desegregation orders. 
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any explanation as to how the one-time sale of state property would 
provide a "dependable and regular" revenue source for funding basic 
education. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 
522, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). 
5. Order Invalidating Education Funding Cuts 
Plaintiffs suggest the Court could invalidate legislation that makes 
cuts to education funding. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. While the Court 
unquestionably has authority to invalidate unconstitutional statutes, 
Plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of any statute in their 
complaint, CP 3-26. In the context of this litigation, therefore, it is far 
from clear what legislation Plaintiffs suggest should be invalidated. 
Perhaps relatedly, Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order enjoining 
the Legislature from imposing "any more unfunded or underfunded 
mandates" on schools. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 49. Putting aside the question 
of how to define an "unfunded or underfunded mandate," this suggestion 
lacks the precision required for a prospective injunction. 17 
17 A court must precisely tailor a permanent injunction to prevent a specific 
harm. Kitsap Cnty. v. Kev, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 135, 143, 720 P.2d 818 (1986). See also 
CR 65(d) (order imposing injunction must describe in reasonable detail the acts enjoined 
as well as the reasons supporting issuance of the injunction, above and beyond the 
complaint or other documents). 
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6. Order Shutting Down the Public School System 
Finally, Plaintiffs step into the deepest water by suggesting the 
Court might shut down all public schools in Washington until such timeas 
they are amply funded. Plfs' 2014 Resp. at 47. This suggestion assumes 
no education is preferable to the education students in Washington 
currently are receiving. In fact, it would most directly harm the very 
persons-school children-Plaintiffs claim to be advocating for. 
Plaintiffs have cited cases in which state courts have issued orders 
temporarily enjoining their state from disbursing money to schools, but 
none of those cases provide a persuasive rationale for applying that 
remedy here. 18 Only one decision, Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 161, 
18 They cite Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Kan. Dist. Ct., 
Shawnee County, May 11, 2004) (unpublished Decision and Order Remedy), in which 
"legislative leaders openly declared their defiance of the Court," ignored the court's 
factual fmdings, and refused to take action in response to the court's order. 2004 WL 
1094555 at *5. After surveying actions taken in other states (none of which had ordered 
the shutdown of public schools), the trial court declared the funding statutes, which it 
already had found unconstitutional, to be void as applied to the funding of public schools 
and enjoined their use for distributing funds for public education. I d. at * 11. 
Significantly, the injunction was to take effect on June 30, while the schools were closed 
for summer. Id. at *15. The Kansas Supreme Court stayed the injunction before it took 
effect. Montoy v. State, No. 92,032 (May 19, 2004) (unpublished order) available at 
http://www .kscourts. org/ Court-Administration/News-Releases/ schoolfinanceorder 
20040519.pdf. 
The decision in Hull v. Albrecht, 192 Ariz. 34, 960 P.2d 634 (1998), marked the 
fourth time in four years that the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality 
of school funding legislation. In its third attempt at compliance, the legislature adopted 
an act establishing a new funding mechanism. The court found an "opt-out" provision in 
the act would continue unconstitutional disparities in funding, held the act 
unconstitutional, and invalidated it. Id. at 639. Invalidating the act left no mechanism for 
distributing state funds to public schools; but rather than immediately enjoining the 
distribution of funds, the court extended the time during which the state could distribute 
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358 A.2d 457 (1976), actually closed the schools, and it did so for a few 
days in the summer of 1976. That decision is one of dozens in four 
decades of litigation over school funding and control in New Jersey. 19 In 
response to earlier decisions, the legislature enacted a statute in 1975 
which the New Jersey Supreme Court found to be constitutional if fully 
funded. When the 1976 legislature did not fully fund it, a divided court 
enjoined all public officers in New Jersey "from expending any funds for 
the support of any free public school," with certain exceptions. Robinson, 
70 N.J. at 160. The court lifted the injunction after the legislature adopted 
an income tax to fund the statute.20 
funds to give the legislature additional time to respond. Id. at 640. The legislature 
responded quickly by deleting the "opt-out" provision, and no bar on distributing funds 
was ever imposed. Hull v. Albrecht, No. CV-98-0238-SA (July 20, 1998) (unpublished 
Order), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/orders/scorder/1999 _20020rders/ 
schorder. pdf. 
Plaintiffs also cite a case involving unconstitutional conditions of confmement 
that is not directly on point, and they erroneously characterize it. The court of appeals 
affirmed a district court order closing a Boston jail if conditions were not remedied, but 
stayed the effective date of the order for six months. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. 
Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 1978). The order did not take effect because of a 
consent judgment, which governed until the jail was completed. Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372-77, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992). 
19 The most recent decision appe~rs to be Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d 
1018 (20 11) (Abbott XXI). 
20 The order dissolving the injunction is not found in Westlaw, but is referenced 
in subsequent decisions of New Jersey courts .. See, e.g., New Jersey Hasp. Ass'n v. New 
Jersey State Dep't of Health, 249 N.J. Super. 194, 204, 592 A.2d 265 (App. Div. 1991) 
(listing the cite as 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976); D.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Brunswick 
Twp., 188 N.J. Super. 592, 605, 458 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1983) (listing the cite as 70 N.J. 
465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976)). 
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The Robinson court imposed the injunction over two extended 
dissents, one of which laid out several reasons for exercising restraint in 
fashioning a judicial remedy. Four of the reasons given proved prescient 
for New Jersey and are relevant to all the sanctions Plaintiffs have 
proposed here: (1) potential violation of separation of powers by intruding 
into areas constitutionally delegated to the legislature; (2) placing in 
jeopardy the court's "power of legitimacy"-"the power to command 
acceptance and support from the community so as to render force 
unnecessary, or necessary only upon a small scale against a few 
recalcitrants"; (3) assuming a task of enforcement that may be beyond the 
competence of the court for lack of supportive resources; (4) an 
institutional inability to view the governmental problem in its entirety and 
as a whole (i.e., without adequate information as to other public needs the 
legislature balances). Robinson, 70 N.J. at 162-64 (Mountain, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in 
American Government 103-05 (1976)) .. 
Plaintiffs here have not articulated how their goal of fully funding 
education is advanced by an order enjoining any disbursement of state 
funds to public schools in Washington. Presumably, they believe the 
pressure will be so great that the Legislature will have no choice but to act 
and to do so quickly. But that is a dangerous strategy. If the remedy fails 
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and schools are closed, it is schoolchildren who are harmed most directly. 
Moreover, those put at greatest risk of harm are those who have the fewest 
educational alternatives-wealthy parents can arrange for educational 
alternatives during a period of school closure, but such options are seldom 
available to families of modest means. Plaintiffs' suggested remedy 
contravenes the constitutional ideal they purport to uphold. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The State shares the Court's goal of achieving full compliance with 
article IX, and the Legislature continues to make progress toward meeting 
the 2018 deadline this Court established. Plaintiffs' arguments to the 
contrary are unfounded and unproductive. No sanction is necessary to 
compel continued progress. 
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